one go about explaining such frequencies, or statistical states, and just what is the structure of such a statistical explanation? Consider Kettlewell's explanation of stable frequencies for the melanic form of the peppered moth (Biston betularia). Biston betularia occurs in two forms, or morphs, j.' typica, which is a mottled gray in color, and J: carbonaria, which is a melanic form of a much darker, black color.' It was known that stable high j.' carbonaria frequencies required a 50% reproductive advantage for$ carbonaria in local populations, which could be explained by appeal to selection if$ carbonaria had, in those local populations, a 50% selective advantage over J: typica. It was generally believed that industrial pollution was somehow responsible for this advantage, but the nature of the causal connection was unknown.
Kettlewell's work included release and recapture experiments in two different environments (1973) . Peppered moths spend the day resting on tree trunks. Prior to industrialization, the relevant tree species were covered in lichen of a mottled gray color. During and after industrialization, some forested areas were subject to high levels of pollutants which killed the lichen, leaving tree bark denuded and darkly stained. Populations of peppered moths with high frequencies of$ carbonaria inhabit areas in which trees have been so denuded of lichen. Kettlewell performed experiments in a denuded and a non-denuded environment. In the non-denuded environment the recapture rate for J: carbonaria was about 6%, while for j.' typica it was about 12 %. In the denuded environment the ordinal relations between recapture rates were reversed, and while actual values varied from experiment to experiment, there was a stable ratio: recapture rates for$ carbonaria were half again as large as those for j.' typica. Kettlewell argues that the differences in recapture rate, in both environments, are generated by differences in mortality rates, and thus we have the required 50% selective advantage for$ carbonaria in denuded environments.
On current theories of statistical explanation, this bit of Kettlewell's work suffices to explain differential reproductive success among peppered moths in denuded environments. Accounts vary, but on all, roughly, a statistical explanation is an explanatory response to a whyquestion about explanandum E that individuates some feature or features of context C, such that C is probabilistically relevant to E, and that 1 ) describes C as a probabilistic cause oj'E, 2) derives, from the occurrence of C, and other relevant facts, an estimate of the probability of E, and finally 3) asserts that E did, as a matter of fact, chance to occur (cf. Railton 1978; Salmon 1970 Salmon , 1984 Humphreys 1989) .2 Kettlewell's explanation, then, is understood roughly as follows. In answer to the question 'Why, in those populations of Biston betularia in which j.' carbonaria has a frequency close to 1, is the proportion of J: carbonaria surviving in any given generation half again as large as the proportion of$ typica that survive?', we specify the following facts. The relevant populations inhabit denuded environments. Dark and light moths enjoy different probabilities of survival. Specifically, in denuded environments, Pr(survival/dark coloration) = 3/2Pr(survival/ light coloration). Thus, 1) coloration is a probabilistic cause of survival in peppered moth populations, and in denuded environments $ carbonaria moths are, in virtue of their dark coloration, half again as likely to survive as J: typica moths. Therefore 2) we should expect that, in reasonably large populations, the proportion of j.' carbonaria surviving will be half again as large as the proportion of$ typica surviving. And 3) as a matter of fact, in most generations, the proportion of surviving dark colored moths is, by chance, half again that of surviving light colored moths. Kettlewell's observations play the essential role of establishing the existence of the relevant causal connection, and providing a measure of its strength.
Explanations, like Kettlewell's, of property frequencies are common in such statistical sciences as sociology and economics (see, e.g., Siegenthaler 1996 , Mulvey 1997 , Chesnais 1996 , Tan and Batra 1997 , and Barrett 1996 . In population biology such explanations are simply unavoidable: one seeks to explain the frequency or co-distribution of some set of alleles, genotypes, or phenotypic properties in particular populations, or to explain the frequency of one or more species or morphs of a given species in some set of geographic regions, and so on. A proper account of such explanations is therefore of considerable interest. There appear, however, to be at least two serious flaws in the standard treatment of such explanations. Salmon (1984) has argued that if we are to understand statistical explanations at all, we must understand them to explain an event by citing the probability of that event in the context, and by individuating the causal features of the context in virtue of which the explanandum 2. On Salmon's 1970 and 1984 accounts, the probability of Egiven Cand other relevant facts is not derived, but merely cited. On Humphreys' 1989 account the probability of E need not even be cited, though some of the features causally responsible for the obtaining of that probability must be. Just when Cis held to be probabilistically, rather than merely statistically, relevant to E varies among accounts. Finally, Humphreys is a realist about explanation; thus, on his account it is not constitutive of explanations that they are answers to why-questions.
has just the probability it does. More contentiously, and, in my view, more persuasively, he also argues that if we are to understand statistical explanations in this way, then we shall have to give up on a number of intuitions about explanation. Following van Fraassen (1980) , let explanandum event Ei be the topic of question Q: 'Why did Ei occur?' with contrast class (El, . . . En). One might think that any adequate explanatory response to Q would amount to an explanation of why Ei rather than any alternative E, occurred. But not so, argues Salmon (1984, 110) .Tor notice that we explain Ei by citing certain features of context C, such that Pr(E,lC)#Pr(E,). Now if Pr(EilC)#l, as in most of the interesting cases, then it will be true that, for some E j in the contrast class, Pr(E,lC)# 0. If we take C and Pr(E,IC) to explain the occurrence of Ei, then, by parity, we shall also have to take C and Pr(E,IC) to explain E,, should it occur. If we do not so allow, e.g., on the grounds that Pr(EiIC) is high while Pr(E,IC) is low, or, more generally, following van Fraassen (1980) , on the grounds that C favors Ei more than it does E,, then we shall have to hold that low probability events, or events unfavored by the causally relevant factors, are inexplicable. This is certainly a result to be avoided, if possible. But to avoid it we must allow that a description that individuates C counts as an explanation of Ei, should it occur, and as an explanation of E,, should it occur. If we so allow then it cannot be that C explains why Ei rather than Ej, for the description of C would equally well be an explanation of E,, should it have occurred. So statistical explanations explain that the explanandum event occurred, but not why the explanandum event rather than anything else occurred; statistical explanations are not, and cannot be, contrastive. If Salmon is right, then we can understand Kettlewell's explanation, and relevantly similar scientific explanations, only if we construe them as statistical explanations that make essential explanatory use of probabilities. Doing this requires that we reject the idea that statistical explanations are contrastive. Explanations of an explanandum E explain that E occurred, but not why E rather than some contrasting E ' occurred. Consequently, the explanation need not mention facts C such that, given C, E could not have failed to occur. And the facts C that 452 BRUCE G1,YMOUR are mentioned can perfectly well explain an event E', alternative to E (cf. Salmon 1984, 1 13-1 15) .
Consequently, Kettlewell's explanation can be said to explain neither why$ carbonaria has a reproductive advantage of 112 rather than anything else, nor why, in denuded environments, it is J: carbonaria which has the reproductive advantage over j typica rather than the other way round. Moreover, if, in a given generation,$ typica happens, by chance, to out-survive$ carbonaria, exactly the same facts that explain the more normal rates of survival in most generations will also explain the actual survival rates which occur in this exceptional case. I think that in adopting this picture of explanation we have not made the right kind of sense of Kettlewell's explanation, since I think that explanation is, if anything, an attempt to explain why$ carbonaria out-survives f: typica, rather than the other way round, in denuded environments.
I agree with Salmon that if we construe statistical explanations generally, and Kettlewell's in particular, as making essential use of probabilities, we shall have to give up on the idea that statistical explanations are contrastive. Nevertheless, I regard the view that scientific explanations are contrastive as, after all, fairly intuitive, and so I regard Salmon's conclusions as unfortunate. And at least one consequence of forgoing contrastive statistical explanations, i.e., that exactly the same contextual features can explain both of a pair of logically exclusive outcomes, whichever should on a given occasion occur, should be regarded as little better than philosophic disaster. 'Explanations' so understood are, in this respect, essentially dissimilar from any pretheoretic notion of explanation, and from any theoretical notion of explanation before 1970 or so. If that is the best we can do, then a virtue of necessity we must make. But not happily, for the virtue is surely one we would forgo if we could.
A second and perhaps even more serious difficulty confronts standard models of statistical explanation. Very often part of the point of a statistical explanation is to individuate the processes that actually produce the explanandum frequency from others that, had they occurred, would have produced the same result. Kettlewell, for example, was concerned to individuate the actual process producing differential survival from such alternatives. He was concerned to show that the process was a) a process of selection rather than drift (1973, 105) , b) a selection process operating on adult rather than larval moths (1973, (78) (79) (80) (81) (82) , and c) not a process involving an environmental poison directly causing the deaths of moths (1973, . Each of these processes, had they occurred, would have generated the same outcome.
This general fact about causal explanations, i.e., that they often aim to explain by identifying which of various contrasting etiologies is actually responsible for the obtaining of the outcome, has been discussed by both Hitchcock (1996) and Lipton (1990) . Standard probabilistic treatments of statistical explanation do not require of an explanation that it identify which of several alternative causal processes actually generate a particular explanandum event. They do not require these things, in part, because quite literally on the accounts of probabilistic causation assumed by them no such identification is possible. Suppose an instance E of property E occurs in a C&C1 context, where both C and C' are probabilistic causes of E. On standard treatments of probabilistic causation, e.g., Humphreys 1989 and Railton 1978 , one cannot say that that E was produced by C, or that E was produced by C', for by hypothesis there is no fact of the matter about which produced E. On such accounts E occurs as a matter of chance against a probability that obtains in virtue of the fact that the context instances both C and C', and there are no further facts of the matter in virtue of which causal responsibility can be attributed either to C alone, or to C' alone. 
The Intuitive Explanatory Strategy.
In what follows I describe an alternative conception of the structure and content of statistical explanations. Before beginning the exposition, one important distinctionwill be essential. Linguistic entities can fail to be successful scientific explanations for either of two reasons: either they can fail to be correct, or acceptable, as explanations offered by Newton, Priestly, and Lamarck fail, or they can simply fail to be explanatory, or adequate, as bare assertions of fact fail to be explanatory. I am here concerned to describe a theory of explanatory adequacy, and I shall therefore ignore the rather large number of epistemic worries that are the appropriate concern of a theory of explanatory acceptability. Aside from the standard worries about whether a statistical relationship between variables, e.g., coloration and survival, is sufficient to ground causal inferences, received explanations face some rather intractable epistemic challenges. If, for example, we are to be realists about Kettlewell's explanation, above, as most scientists are, we shall have to be realists about objective physical probabilities. The epistemic difficulties attendant such realism are well known (see, e.g., van Fraassen 1989 and Kelly 1996) . Similar, though perhaps not identical, epistemic difficulties will confront any realist theory of statistical explanation, including that offered here.
We will do well to begin by considering again the explanations we offer of the frequencies of deterministically caused properties. The explanation of the frequency of E in the deterministic case has a number of features that we might wish to preserve in the probabilistic case. In the deterministic case the explanandum is deductively derived from the explanans. Consequently, seeing that the explanans is true suffices to establish that the explanandum is true as well, and that each of the contrasting alternatives is false Cjust so do we explain the real frequency of E rather than any other). Furthermore, the explanans contains causal descriptions of a very particular sort: the causal language first describes a kind of causal interaction (the kind that produces instances of E from instances of C), and describes, second, the frequency of that kind of interaction in the population.
What would such an explanation in the probabilistic case look like? We would want an explanation that was a deductive argument, with the frequency of E as the conclusion. We should want the explanans to include a description of the way in which instances of E are causally produced, and we should want the explanans to include a claim about the frequency of causal interactions satisfying this description. Could we satisfy the latter two desiderata, we would of course be in a position to satisfy the first. Finally, and especially in the case of probabilistically caused properties, we should like our account to be able to treat cases in which there is more than one causal pathway by which instances of E are produced.
So, to take an example, suppose E is lung cancer, and P is a population of persons, some of whom smoke (9,some of whom have been exposed to radiation (R), and some of whom have been exposed to DDT (I). Exposure to any one of these things is a probabilistic cause of lung cancer. Were lung cancer a deterministically caused property, we would explain the frequency of E in P by listing the three kinds of causal interactions ( S + E, R + E, I+E), and specifying the frequency of each in P. From these facts and the further claim that there are no other causes of E operative in P, we would derive the frequency of E in P. Now E, lung cancer, is in fact probabilistically caused. But this is not necessarily or obviously a difficulty for the proposed explanatory pattern. Although lung cancer is probabilistically caused, any case of cancer presumably has a particular causal history, and so a particular cause. Any particular case of cancer is either a result of exposure to S, or to R or to I.4 SO, presumably, there is still a fact of the matter about the frequency of each kind of causal interaction (albeit probabilistic causal interaction) in the population. And if we count up the frequencies of each kind of interaction, we can again derive the frequency of E in the population.
Still, there are a number of problems such an account faces. Such an explanatory pattern presumes that probabilistically caused property instances have determinate, causal, etiologies, and that instances of each kind of causal interaction can, at least in principle, be individuated and counted. I know of no account of probabilistic causation in the current philosophic literature that satisfies these conditions, though Woodward (1990) implicitly argues that a correct account ofprobabilisticcausation ought to satisfy them. Below, I offer a partial metaphysics for indeterministic causation which meets all of the above desiderata. Before presenting the relevant details we must deal with some necessary preliminaries about the correct way to individuate causal connections. In the next section I shall present an account of causal mechanisms, which will lay the ground for the subsequent account of probabilistic causation. A warning is in order. The reader should beware confusing the sort of mechanism I have in mind with the conception of mechanism examined, e.g., in Salmon 1994 and Dowe 1995. On their conception, an account of causal mechanisms is a theory about how to demarcate causal from non-causal connections. A theory of causal mechanisms in the sense I have in mind is a theory about how to individuate sets of causal connections from other sets of causal connections.
3. Causes, States, and Mechanisms. If we are to provide an account of statistical explanation, we must know how we are to describe causal 4. 1do not mean to rule out the possibility of cancer cases that occur as a causal result of exposure to two or more of the relevant variables. I merely note that some cases of cancer are not like this, and that the desired account of statistical explanation must allow for a distinction between those cases in which, e.g., cancer is produced by both S and R, and those cases in which, e.g., cancer is produced by S alone or by R alone, even though subjects are exposed to both. For exegetical ease I consider a population in which no cancer case results from a process essentially involving any two of I, R, and S. connections in explanatory contexts. How we describe causal connections depends essentially on how we individuate causal connections from one another. I am here concerned to introduce an individuation scheme for causal connections in explanatory contexts.
Consider a basic causal connection between two entities A and B, i.e., the connection cannot be decomposed into a connection between A and some C, and another between C and B. Call such basic connections causal interactions. Any complete individuation of the A-B interaction from others requires that we identify 1) the features of A and B in virtue of which the interaction occurs, if any, 2) the new features produced by this interaction, and 3) the temporal interval over which the interaction obtains. The relata of the interaction, the nature of the features, and constraints on temporal intervals will vary between theories of causation-e.g., A and B might be objects, or events, or properties; the relevant features might be property instances or event aspects; simultaneous causation may or may not be permitted. For exegetical ease I shall henceforth assume that the relata of interactions are objects, that the features in virtue of which interactions obtain are property instances, and that causation is diachronic and forward directed. I further assume that causal interactions are instances of a primitive, unanalyzable metaphysical category. Those inclined to different causal ontologies need only treat the relata, features, and temporal constraints differently, per the preferred theory of causation; a commitment to the individuation scheme requires no commitment to the ontology I deploy. While the individuation conditions do not require the assumption that causal interactions are real, much less primitive, entities (i.e., things in the world over and above the relata they connect and the features in virtue of which they do so), realism about interactions is required by the account of probabilistic causation offered below.
Let the extension of the predicate 'causal interaction' include all and only the basic causal connections. Let any particular item satisfying the predicate be a singular entity that 1) obtains between some pair of objects; 2) does so in virtue of some subset of the property instances had by the connected objects; and 3) produces one or more new property instances for one of the connected objects (i.e., causal interactions are directed). The individuation criteria are generalizable to triples, quadruples, etc., of objects, but for exegetical ease I treat here only pairwise interactions. A causal interaction may then be identified by the pair of objects between which it obtains, the property instances in virtue of which it obtains (the licensing property instances for the interaction) and the property instances it produces. Any causal interaction is an instance of a kind, or what I shall call a causal relation. The causal interaction Cr in Figure 1 , which obtains in virtue of property instances P, (of 0 , ) and P, (of O,), and produces property instance E (of O,), is an instance of the causal relation CR, defined as the set of all interactions obtaining between pairs of objects, each licensed by an instance of P, exhibited by one object, and an instance of P, exhibited by a second object, and each producing an instance of E. Any particular causal relation may then be individuated by two sets of licensing properties, one set for each interacting object, and a set of effect properties. We can then quite simply individuate any particular causal interaction from others. An instance Cr of CR is individuated from causal interactions of other kinds by the fact that Cr is an instance of CR, and from other instances of CR in terms of the particular objects between which Cr obtains and the time at which it does so.
Objects can be causally connected indirectly by a sequence of causal interactions, e.g. there can be a causal interaction between objects 0, and O,, another between 0, and O,, yet another between 0, and 0,, and so on. Some of these causal paths will be of especial explanatory importance. Consider the special case where the 0,-0,interaction produces a property instance of 0, that is a licensing property instance for the 0,-0,interaction, and so on. Define a causal trace to be such an ordered sequence of interactions. Note that I am consequently treating the basic causal connections as non-transitive. Every trace is a member of a trace kind, or a causal process, defined as a set of traces such that for any pair of traces in a given process, the ith interaction in the first is a member of the same causal relation as the ith interaction in the Figure 1 . The Causal Interacticrl Cr. Interaction Cr obtains between objects 0,and O,, in virtue of property instances P, (of 0 , ) and P, (of O,), and produces property instance E (of 0,).Cr is a member of the causal relation CR. C R is the kind of causal interaction licensed by instances of properties P, (P, E P I )and P2 (P2C P2). and productive of instances of E (E C E).
second, for all i. We may then individuate a process as an ordered sequence of constituent causal relations (Figure 2) .
In order to define 'causal mechanism' we need one further concept, that of a state. A state is simply the assignment of values to the frequencies of one or more properties in each cell of a partition of a specified population. Formally, a state is defined as an ordered 5-tuple (P,(El . . . En), r {A,,. . . ,A,, . . . ,A,, . . . ,Ai), t ) where P i s apopulation, El through Enproperties, r a partition of P, eachAj a frequency and t a time, whereAj represents the frequency of property E, in the jth cell of the partition r of P at t. So our population of persons, some of whom have cancer and some of whom do not, instantiates any number of states, one of which is simply the frequency f of lung cancer in P.
Let S, and S2be states defined over populations PI and P, (these may, but need not, be the same population at different times). The causal mechanism connecting S, and S2is composed of the collection of all traces from some object in P, to some object in P,. So, for example, consider our population P of persons at t and again at the later time t ' . There is a state (S,) that describes P at t with respect to the frequency of exposure to S (cigarette smoke), R (x-ray radiation) and I (DDT). Likewise, there is a state (S,) that describes P at t ' with respect to the frequency of lung cancer. Some members of P (perhaps all) will be on a trace from themselves at t to themselves at t ' . Thus, there will be a mechanism connecting S, to S,. These states and a hypothetical connecting mechanism M containing three kinds of traces Figure 2 . The Causal Trace T. The causal trace T consists in the sequence of causal interactions (Cr, , , , Cr2, 3, Cr, , 4) . T is an instance of the trace kind T, which is individuated by the sequence of causal relations (CR,,CR,,CR,), where Cr,,, € CR,, Cr,, € CR, and Cr,, € CR,.
CONTRASTIVE STATISTICAL EXPLANATIONS
( T I = (CRl, CR2, CR, ) , T2 = (CR,,CR,,CR,) and T, = (CR,,CR,) ) are illustrated in Figure 3 .
In Section 5 I shall argue that certain descriptions of mechanisms, statistical specijications of mechanisms, are explanatorily adequate with respect to how-questions about the origin of property frequencies. If M is a mechanism connecting states S , and S2,where S2is defined over population P and properties E = {E,. . . En), then any pair of causal processes T , and T2 in M are non-inclusive with respect to S2 if and only if there is no pair of traces Ti E T l and T, E T2,such that T, and T, both terminate in an interaction Cr that produces a particular instance E of property E E E. A statistical speciJication of M with respect to S2 must 1) individuate a set of jointly non-inclusive causal processes in M, each of which terminates in an E producing relation for some property E E E, and 2) specify the frequency of those processes in each cell of the partition over which S2 is defined. Consider again the two P a t t P a t t' Figure 3 . The Mechanism M. The hypothetical mechanism M between P at t and P at t' consists in all the traces between objects in P at t and objects in P at t ' , here T, = 
(CR,,CR,,CR,) (dashed lines), T, = (CR,,CR,,CR,) (dotted line) and T, = (CR,,CR,) (solid lines).
Only CR, and CR, are E producing causal relations.
states S, and S2and the mechanism M connecting them, illustrated in Figure 3 . There are three trace-kinds, TI, T, and T,. Suppose that T, and T2 traces terminate in an E producing interaction, while T, traces do not. A statistical specification of M, then, consists in an individuation of the E producing trace kinds in M (TI and T2) and a specification of the frequencies of each such trace kind among the objects in S,. The two trace kinds can be individuated from other trace kinds in M by the fact that they are E producing trace kinds, and can be individuated from each other by the inclusion of CR, or CR,. One statistically specifies M with respect to the frequency of E in S2by so individuating TI and T,, and then specifying the frequency of each in the single cell of the partition over which S2is defined, here .4 and .2 respectively.
The explanatory importance of mechanisms so defined and statistical specifications of them will be obvious from a consideration of causal explanation in deterministic cases. The question remains, however, whether such mechanisms and their descriptions will be of any use in the probabilistic case, for if traces are defined over probabilistic causes, as traditionally understood, then effect frequencies will not be deducible from trace frequencies.
Probabilistic Causation.
On current accounts of probabilistic causation, causal traces that include probabilistic interactions will not always terminate in the production of a relevant effect property. Begin tracing forward from P at t to P at t' along the causal paths that produce instances of E. When one comes to the proximate, and probabilistic, cause of (causal interaction productive of) an instance of E, what one finds is an object with an instance of C. The presence of an instance of C does not determine the occurrence of an instance of E, but rather, at most, a probability for the instancing of E. Thus, given an instance of C and therefore an instance of the probabilistic causal relation between C and E, we cannot deductively infer that an instance of E will occur.
Clearly what is needed is a different kind of account of probabilistic causation. If one is a realist about causal interactions, it is possible to hold that it is a matter of chance whether or not causal interactions of a specified kind occur (in relevant background conditions), but that given the (chance) occurrence of such an interaction, the interaction determinately produces the associated effect. I here use the individuation scheme outlined above to explicate the concept of probabilistic causation I have in mind. In so doing, I again ignore all of those epistemic worries a solution to which would constitute a proper theory of probabilistic causation embodying the suggested conceptual revision (Cheng 1997 offers a similar account of probabilistic causation that does not entirely ignore the epistemic issues).
'Probabilistic' and 'deterministic' are to be understood as predicates applicable to causal relations. A causal relation is probabilistic just in case, given the instantiation of the licensing properties for the relation, it is a matter of chance whether or not the causal relation is instantiated, i.e., it is a matter of chance whether or not an interaction of the specified kind occurs. A causal relation is deterministic just in case this is not true, i.e., just in case, given that the relevant properties are instantiated, an interaction of the specified kind always occurs. For any causal relation, whether deterministic or probabilistic, if an interaction of the kind occurs, then the interaction determinately, always, produces the associated effect. We can then parasitically speak of causal interactions as being 'probabilistic'; such interactions are members of a causal relation that is probabilistic in the described sense. Thus, if a probabilistic causal interaction occurs, it does so as a matter of chance. But also, if it occurs, it produces the associated effect, not as a matter of chance, but determinately. This account has two advantages over standard treatments of probabilistic causation. First, it permits deterministic explanations of probabilistically caused effects. Second, while it does require a realism about indeterminacy, it does not require a realism about quantitative physical probabilities, though it is perfectly compatible with realism of the latter sort.
Suppose that probabilistic interactions work in the suggested way.
Consider again the traces connecting P at t to P at t ', assuming that C is a licensing property for a probabilistic causal relation, instances of which produce instances of E. Each instance of E will be produced by an interaction which obtains (as a matter of chance) in virtue of some instance of C. Consequently, every object possessing an instance of E is on a trace that runs through an object possessing an instance of C and that terminates in an E producing interaction (licensed by an instance of C). Of course, not all instances of C in P during the temporal segment t-t ' will be on such traces, for sometimes, as a matter of chance, instances of C occur without the consequent occurrence of an E producing interaction, and thus without the consequent occurrence of an instance of E. But, for those instances of C that do, by chance, occasion an instance of an E producing interaction, an instance of E will be generated. Thus, by describing and counting the traces that include an E producing interaction we can derive the frequency of E in P. The expansion to cases in which there is more than one probabilistic cause of E is trivial.
An Alternative Theory of Adequacy and Paired Model of Explanation.

BRUCE GLYMOUK
We are now in a position to formulate a theory of adequacy and paired model for statistical explanations. Explanations are responses to questions, and they are adequate with respect to such a question provided they answer it (whether they are acceptable answers is another matter). I take the questions to which statistical explanations are addressed to have the general form 'How was S2 rather than S, in fact generated from S, given C,?', where S, is a state at t, S, is a state at t', S, a contrasting possible state at t ' that would have obtained had C,, a set of causal processes with specified frequencies, obtained between t and t'. S2and S, are to be defined over the same population P, and over the same properties El through E,. The topic of such a question is S,, the contrast class is S*, where S* is the set of all possible states of P with respect to the frequencies of the properties over which S2is defined. S, is the member of S*with which the question explicitly contrasts s,. So, for example, let S, be the frequency of skin cancer in a population P of persons, say .5; let S, be a contrasting frequency, say .l; let C, be the frequency .1 for the causal process by which the base analogue bromouracil induces the relevant carcinogenic mutations in mitosis; and let S, be defined over P prior to the appearance of any case of skin cancer. A question about the origin of S2would then be canonically phrased in the following way: 'How did the frequency of skin cancer in P at t' come to be .5 rather than .l, given that at t the frequency was 0.0, and skin cancer is the result of carcinogenic mutations induced by bromouracil, and this process has a frequency of .l in P, between t and t I?'. Such how-questions are etiological. They call for a response that describes the causal history of those objects, with respect to those properties, over which S2is defined. Any statistical explanation is an adequate explanation provided it is an explanatorily adequate response to some or another legitimate, well-formed scientific how-question, and in particular, it is an adequate explanation with respect to that question. How-questions identify a target state, a state of origin, and a contrasting etiological history that, had it obtained, would have generated a state different from the target state. Such questions request of the responder that she identify the etiology that did in fact obtain, and show that the obtaining of that etiology was sufficient to generate the target state. In particular, the responder must describe the actual etiology in sufficient detail to individuate that etiology from the contrasting etiology C, specified by the question to which the explanatory response is directed. However, the responder is not required to show that the relevant etiology had to have obtained; she is merely required to describe the etiology in sufficient detail to show that given that it did obtain, S, would have been generated rather than any alternative to it, and rather than S, in particular. Consequently, I shall take it that a response to a how-question is explanatorily adequate provided that it 1) describes some C,, a set of causal processes and frequencies thereof, such that, had only those processes occurred in just those frequencies, S, would have been generated, and 2) derives S2from S, and C2 (note that such responses may be unsuccessful, though adequate, if the information they provide is incorrect)."
In response to the above how-question, an adequate answer might note that: ' 115 of the cases of skin cancer, in P at t ', were produced by mutations that were, in turn, produced by bromouracil, and that the remaining 415 of the skin cancer cases were generated when a pyrimidine dimer, produced by UV radiation, was paired with adenine rather than guanine during replication. There were, where P is of size N, 4N/10 mutations produced by UV radiation, and 1N/10 mutations produced by the intercalating chemical, and since both kinds of mutations lead to skin cancer, S, rather than S, was produced.' Note that this explanation is explicitly contrastive. Moreover, the production of any arbitrary St E S*, S' # S,, would have required an etiological history C' such that C' and C2 differ, minimally, in the frequencies attributed to constituent causal processes. Since the explanation states that C, obtained, the explanation entails that C' did not obtain, and hence shows why S' did not obtain. Thus, the explanation explains why S2 occurred rather than any alternative state S t , where S' E S*. How-questions about the origin of statistical states are commonly put in non-canonical form, e.g., questions about the common cause of a pair of statistical states, and cases in which S,, S,, or C, are contextually implicit or simply open. But if the questions are well-formed and legitimate, they can, without loss of content, be restructured in the canonical fashion. Frequently, S,, and yet more frequently S, and C,, are left unspecified, and this has important implications for the adequacy of a response to a given how-question. If, in a given howquestion, C, is described in significant detail, and the responder's description of C, is insufficiently detailed to individuate causal processes in C, from causal processes in C,, that description of C, will not be explanatorily adequate with respect to the how-question to which it is addressed. It may nonetheless be an adequate response to a hare 5. Using van Fraassen's (1980) machinery, a why-question is a triple Q = (Pk,X,R) of topic, contrast class and relation, where an answer A is explanatorily relevant to Q if A bears R to (Pk,X). The use of 'how' rather than 'why' in the above discussion simply marks a claim about the appropriate R for statistical explanations: A bears R to (Pk,X) just in case A is a set of frequencies for a set of causal processes, such that had only those processes occurred, and had they done so with the specified frequencies, Pkwould have been produced.
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BRUCE GLYMOUR how-question, and thus constitute an adequate statistical explanation. A how-question is bare just in case it can be put in the following form without loss of content: 'How was S, generated?'. For such questions the choice of S,, S,, and C, is left open to the responder, and consequently any description of C,, provided it individuates the constitutive causal processes from one another and is sufficient for the derivation of S2, will be an explanatorily adequate response to a bare howquestion.
Suppose that S, and S, are connected by a mechanism M. To answer the bare how-question 'How was S2generated?' we need only specify S, and Min sufficient detail to allow the derivation of S,, and then perform the requisite derivation. A statistical specification of M with respect to S,, conjointly with any description of S,, suffices to permit the derivation, provided the statistical specification individuates a collection of processes T = {T,,. . . ,T,) such that, for each instance E of every property E over which S, is defined, E is on at least one trace T, E T,, T, E T (if E should be on more than one such trace, the individuated processes are not jointly non-inclusive, and so the description of M is not a statistical specification). Consequently, we have the following model of statistical explanation: A statistical explanation of a state S, consists in the derivation of S, from a set of sentences that 1) identify some prior state S,, and 2) statistically specify with respect to S2some mechanism Mthat putatively connects S, and S2. Any such linguistic entity is an adequate statistical explanation because any such linguistic entity will be an explanatorily adequate response to the bare how-question 'How was S2 generated?'. I shall call statistical explanations that meet the conditions of the proposed model mechanistic statistical explanations.
The discussion so far has left unaddressed important questions about the detail in which mechanisms must be described if explanations featuring such descriptions are to be adequate with respect to particular non-bare how-questions. How do the contrasting state and etiology specified by a non-bare how-question serve to constrain the detail in which a mechanism is described? Here I shall merely lay down some strictures on the requisite descriptive detail. Stronger requirements are possible, though requirements that are too strong will be unsatisfiable. I take the standards given below to be minimal standards in the sense that weaker standards will simply not demand enough information of adequate explanations. I leave to the reader any judgments about whether even stronger standards are required, and whether or not they can be met (alternative accounts of the way in which contrasts serve to constrain explanatory descriptions of causal histories can be found in Lipton 1990 , Lewis 1986 , and Hitchcock 1996 . Suppose S, is produced by mechanism M. In the optimal case, an explanation of S, would describe M so as to individuate each licensing and effect property for each causal relation, in sequence, for each causal process in M, and further, individuate processes in Mfrom those in any contrasting set of processes C, specified by the how-question to which the explanation is addressed. Clearly we are rarely in a position to satisfy this demand. Permissible departures from the best case are of two sorts, the black-boxing of sequences of causal relations, and the black-boxing of licensing and effect properties for causal relations. Let TI and T, be processes in M, or C, or both. If T, and T, share no causal relations, then to individuate them requires only that one constitutive relation for each be described. If T, and T, share causal relations, then T, and T, must be individuated by a description, for each, of a constituent relation not shared by the other. If T, and T, share all causal relations, but differ in the order of those relations, then some sub-sequence of relations, for each, that differ in the order of included relations, must be described.
Causal relations used to individuate causal processes must be at least partially described; all others may be completely undescribed. If processes T, and T,, members of either M or C,, or both, are individuated in terms of CR, and CR,, belonging to the respective processes, then at least one licensing and one effect property for CR,, that are not similar properties for CR,, and at least one licensing and one effect property of CR,, that are not similar properties for CR,, must be specified. Finally, if a sequence of causal relations is described, then, for each sequential pair of relations, at least one effect property for the first that is also a licensing property for the second must be identified.
Given that causal processes in M must be individuated from processes in C,, the more fully C, is specified by a given question, and the more closely C, resembles M, the greater are the descriptive demands on an adequate explanatory response to the question. This is as it should be. A novice student of genetics, asking a how-question about the origin of a 3:l flower color ratio in an F, generation is unlikely to want a description of the causal details in virtue of which segregation and assortment are statistically unbiased, but very likely to want to know that the parental flowers are heterozygous, that allele A is dominant to allele a, and that segregation and assortment are statistically unbiased. A molecular geneticist, on the other hand, might have quite different explanatory interests, e.g., she might be puzzled by the fact that, in this case, segregation and assortment are unbiased, because she believes allele a to be a segregation distorter. By an appropriate choice of C,, she may demand that those interests be satisfied by an adequate response to her request for an explanation.
6. Explanations of Singular Events: the Degenerative Case. It turns out that, on the above model, one can give mechanistic explanations of singular probabilistic events, i.e., events constituted by a single object coming to instantiate a single property. Consider, e.g., Igor's coming to have skin cancer. Igor constitutes a population P, over which we can define the state S, with respect to the frequency of skin cancer: (P,(C),P,J;, = l,t,). In response to the question 'How was S, generated from S,?', where S, is defined over P at some time to prior to Igor's developing cancer, one need only describe the etiology of Igor's case in order to provide a satisfactory mechanistic explanation.
At least two philosophers, Railton (1978) and Humphreys (1989) , when proposing accounts of probabilistic explanation have insisted that once the probability of a singular event and/or the factors relevant to the obtaining of just that probability have been adduced, there is no more to say about the origin of the event. If Igor's cancer above is probabilistically caused, say by exposure to both UV radiation and a chemical carcinogen, then all we can do by way of explaining it is to cite the probability of the cancer occurring, and/or the fact of exposure, or both. To ask for more information is to ask for what cannot be-a reason that an essentially probabilistic event had to occur. Hence one cannot say either that in fact a UV-photon produced the cancer, or that in fact the carcinogen did. Igor's cancer has no determinate etiology in this sense.
If one understands probabilistic causes to determinately change the probability of their effects, as does Humphreys, then this is a perfectly sensible view. It is not so sensible on the account of probabilistic causation outlined in Section 4: if one thinks that probabilistic causal interactions occur by chance, but determinately produce their effects when they occur, then though Igor's cancer occurs as a matter of chance, the cancer does have a determinate etiology. It is either generated by an interaction between Igor's DNA and a UV-photon, or an interaction between the DNA and a molecule of the carcinogen, or, when both photon and carcinogen are immediate causes of the mutation, by an interaction between the triplet of objects, photon, carcinogen and DNA. Igor's cancer nevertheless occurs by chance, since it is a matter of chance whether any interaction of the requisite sort obtains.
It might be argued that the alternative account of probabilistic causation comes at an unacceptable epistemic cost. If the relevant changes in DNA can, with very low probability, simply happen, then it may be that there is no empirically accessible fact of the matter about what caused Igor's cancer, UV radiation, carcinogen, both, or nothing. If all facts worthy of the name are empirically accessible, then there is no fact of the matter at all about what caused Igor's cancer, and any metaphysical position that says there is must be mistaken . Woodward 1990 provides what amounts to a detailed critique of the envisaged objection. The objections to standard models of probabilistic explanation raised in the introduction of this paper in effect provide yet another response to the objection: standard models of probabilistic causation, whatever their epistemic virtues, come at an unacceptably high explanatory cost. Explanations of property frequencies that appeal to multiple probabilistic causes, on standard accounts of such causes, can be neither contrastive nor appropriately etiological.
7. From Frequencies to Distributions: the Interesting Cases. So far, we have discussed explanations of the frequency of a property E in a population P. But very often it is the distribution, or more generally some fact about the distribution, of E across sub-populations of P, for which we wish an explanation. Consider again our original cancer case. Suppose P consists of 1000 persons, 500 of whom smoke. We can partition P into two sub-populations P, and P,, where P, includes all and only the smokers and P, all and only the non-smokers. Now suppose the frequency of lung cancer differs between P, and P,: there are 103cases of cancer in P, 77 in P, and 26 in P,. All cases of cancer in P are produced by causal traces of one of three kinds: TI, which is the kind of trace that runs from cigarette smoke to lung cancer, T,, which is the kind of trace that runs from x-ray photons to lung cancer, and T,, which is the kind of trace that runs from DDT molecules to lung cancer. Suppose that P, includes 52 persons on a T, trace, 23 persons on T2 trace and 2 persons on a T, trace. P, includes no persons on a T, trace, 25 persons on a T, trace and one person on a T, trace. We wish an explanation of the distribution of E in P, that is, we wish to know how P, came to have a higher frequency of lung cancer than P2. We can do this if we give a statistical specification of the mechanism M with respect to S2which is defined over the property E and the partition of P at t ' into sub-populations PI and P2, where M is the mechanism connecting P at t to P at t ' (Figure 4) .
The history of each sub-population will be different in that 1) different causal processes will produce cases of cancer and 2) the causal processes will occur in different frequencies. The net difference in cancer frequency is then an artifact of the sum of the differences in the frequencies of each kind of cancer producing trace. If we know the frequencies of each cancer producing trace kind in the history of each sub-population, we can then derive our explanandum: the difference in the frequency of cancer in each sub-population. A statistical specification of the mechanism M with respect to the state S2defined over lung cancer and the partition of P into sub-populations P, and P2 provides exactly this information. In particular, P, has only 26 cases Figure 4 . The Causal History of Population P. Three cancer producing trace kinds are instanced in the mechanism M connecting P at t to P at t ': T,, on which are smoke particles; T,, on which are x-ray photons; and T,, on which are molecules of DDT.
of cancer while P, has 77 because P2 has 25 T, traces and 1 T3trace, but no T, traces, while P2has a comparable number of T2and T3traces (23 and 2, respectively) but also has 52 TItraces. 8. A Concluding Example. Mechanistic explanations, then, answer howquestions about the origin of property frequencies or distributions in particular populations. They do so by individuating the kinds of causal traces productive of the relevant property or properties, and then specifying the frequencies of these trace kinds in the history of the relevant population or sub-population. Kettlewell's explanation can be understood as of this kind.
Aside from the recapture experiments, Kettlewell's work includes two further sets of observations: the first are direct observations of the relation between 'crypsis' and predation, the second observations of moth behavior when selecting a resting site on which to spend the day. In the direct observations Kettlewell discriminates between moths that are 'conspicuous' and those that are 'inconspicuous', and then rates the degree of 'crypsis' for moths of each type. The observations of site selection suggest that conspicuousness is a function of contrasts in coloration and orientation between moths and background (cf. Kettlewell 1973, 67-73, 114-1 19) . Kettlewell then observes particular, rated moths, of each morph and of differing degrees of crypsis, as they rest on trees during the day. The observations result in the discovery that moths are eaten by birds. Further, the moths are eaten in the order of rated conspicuousness. This grounds the inference that moths are eaten consequent to a bird noticing a moth, and birds do this by noticing some contrast, measured by Kettlewell's rating system, between moth and background. Kettlewell also discovers that inconspicuous moths are at greater risk for predation when they rest on trees also occupied by conspicuous moths (cf. 1973, 125-129) . We thus have a discrimination between two different causal processes that terminate in predation events. Finally, in the study conducted in the non-denuded, lichen rich environment, every J: typica was inconspicuous, and every J: carbonaria was conspicuous, while in the study in the denuded, lichen poor environment, more than 90% of$ carbonaria were inconspicuous, while 80% of$ typica were conspicuous.
We can then interpret Kettlewell's explanation as follows. First we have an individuation of different causal processes by which moths come to be eaten by birds: those consequent to a contrast (T, traces), and those consequent to a noticing of a different moth on the same tree (T, traces). We then have an argument, given by Kettlewell, that the difference between recapture rates for light and dark morphs is due specifically to differences in predation rates: in denuded environments, birds notice proportionately more light morphs than dark morphs, and so birds eat proportionately more light morphs than dark morphs (cf. 1973, 116-121) . Finally, the recapture rates are held to represent the relative frequency of all trace kinds producing predation in the target populations. Thus, as a whole, the experimental results firstly distinguish two different causal processes that generate failure to reproduce, and secondly estimate their actual collective frequencies for each morph, and thus explain the rates of survival. Since the reproductive advantage off carbonaria is constituted by the ratio between survival rates, an explanation of the survival rates is an explanation of the reproductive advantage.
The success of this reconstruction of Kettlewell's explanation depends on the assumption that if, in denuded environments, the proportion of f typica on TI traces is larger than the proportion of f carbonaria that are on TI or T, traces, then this explains why the survival rate among$ carbonaria is higher than that among f typica, rather than the reverse. I think this assumption is borne out by our intuitive response to Kettlewell's explanation. It seems to me that our
